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Abstract
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching
markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain
about the other agents’ true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching
is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that given a common prior,
a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete
information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the
support of the common prior, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under
complete information in the direct preference revelation game induced by the
stable mechanism.
JEL Classification: C78, D81, J44.
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1 Introduction
Centralized many-to-one matching markets operate as follows to match the agents
from two sides, the firms (colleges, hospitals, schools, etc.) and the workers (stu-
dents, medical interns, children, etc.): a centralized clearinghouse collects for each
participant a ranked list of potential partners and matches via a mechanism firms
and workers on the basis of the submitted ranked lists. In applications many of
the successful mechanisms are stable.12 The literature has considered stability of a
matching (in the sense that all agents have to be matched to acceptable partners and
no unmatched pair of a firm and a worker prefer each other rather than the proposed
partners) to be its main characteristic in order to survive.3 This is puzzling because
there exists no stable mechanism which makes truth-telling a dominant strategy for
all agents (Roth, 1982). Therefore, an agent’s (submitted) ranked lists of potential
partners are not necessarily his true ones and the implemented matching may not
be stable for the true profile. The literature has studied intensively Nash equilibria
of direct preference revelation games induced by different stable mechanisms under
complete information.4
We use the (ordinally) Bayesian approach in many-to-one matching markets by
assuming that nature selects a preference profile according to a commonly known
probability distribution on the set of profiles (a common prior).5 Since matching
1See Roth (1984a), Roth and Peranson (1999), and Roth (2002) for a careful description and
analysis of the American entry-level medical market. Roth (1991), Kesten (2005), U¨nver (2005),
and Ehlers (2008) describe and analyze the equivalent UK markets.
2Chen and So¨nmez (2006), Ergin and So¨nmez (2006), and Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che, and Yosuda
(2011) study the case of public schools in Boston, Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) studies the
cases of public schools in Boston, Lee County (Florida), Minneapolis, and Seattle, and Abdulka-
dirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005, 2009) study the case of public high schools in New York City.
3See, for instance, Roth (1984a) and Niederle and Roth (2003).
4See Dubins and Freedman (1981), Roth (1982, 1984b, 1985), Gale and Sotomayor (1985), Shin
and Suh (1996), So¨nmez (1997), Ma (1995, 2002), and Alcalde (1996).
5Roth (1989) is the first paper studying strategic incentives generated by stable mechanisms
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markets require to report ranked lists and not their specific utility representations,
we stick to the ordinal setting and assume that probability distributions are evaluated
according to the first-order stochastic dominance criterion. Then, a strategy profile is
an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium (OBNE) if, for every von Neumann Morgenstern
(vNM)-utility function of an agent’s preference ordering (his type), the submitted
ranked list maximizes his expected utility in the direct preference revelation game
induced by the common prior and the mechanism.6 For direct preference revelation
games under incomplete information induced by a stable mechanism, our main result
shows a link between Nash equilibria under complete information and OBNE under
incomplete information. More precisely, Theorem 1 states that, given a common prior,
a strategy profile is an OBNE under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if
and only if for any profile in the support of the common prior, the submitted profile
is a Nash equilibrium under complete information at the true profile in the direct
preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the many-to-one matching
market with responsive preferences and introduces incomplete information and the
notion of ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section 3 states our main result, Theo-
rem 1, and its applications. Section 4 discusses variations of our main result and the
Appendix contains all proofs.
under incomplete information. He shows that for particular vNM-utility representations of the
ordinal preferences, Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information may not satisfy appealing
properties of Nash equilibria under complete information. Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky
(2010) study two-sided matching markets with interdependent preferences.
6This notion was introduced by d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) who call it “ordinal Bayesian
incentive-compatibility”. Majumdar and Sen (2004) use it to relax strategy-proofness in the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. Majumdar (2003), Pais (2005), and Ehlers and Masso´ (2007)
have already used this ordinal equilibrium notion in one-to-one matching markets.
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2 Many-To-One Matching Markets
Let W denote the set of workers, F denote the set of firms, and V ≡ F ∪W denote the
set of agents. For each firm f , there is a maximum number qf ≥ 1 of workers that f
may hire, f ’s quota. Let q = (qf )f∈F denote the vector of quotas. Each worker w has
a strict preference ordering Pw over F ∪ {∅}, where ∅ stands for being unmatched.
Each firm f has a strict preference ordering Pf over W ∪ {∅}, where ∅ stands for
leaving a position unfilled. A profile P = (Pv)v∈V is a list of preference orderings.
Given S ⊆ V , we sometimes write (PS, P−S) instead of P . Let Pv be the set of all
preference orderings of agent v. Let P = ×v∈VPv be the set of all profiles and let
P−v = ×v′∈V \{v}Pv′ . Let Rv denote the weak preference associated with Pv. Given
w ∈ W , Pw ∈ Pw, and v ∈ F ∪ {∅}, let B(v, Pw) denote the weak upper contour
set of Pw at v; i.e., B(v, Pw) = {v′ ∈ F ∪ {∅} | v′Rwv}. Let A(Pw) be the set of
acceptable firms for w according to Pw; i.e., A(Pw) = {f ∈ F | fPw∅}. Given a subset
S ⊆ F ∪ {∅}, let Pw|S denote the restriction of Pw to S. Similarly, given Pf ∈ Pf ,
v ∈ W ∪{∅}, and S ⊆ W ∪{∅}, we define B(v, Pf ), A(Pf ), and Pf |S. A many-to-one
matching market (or college admissions problem) is a quadruple (F,W, q, P ). Because
F , W and q remain fixed, a problem is simply a profile P ∈ P . If qf = 1 for all f ∈ F ,
(F,W, q, P ) is called a one-to-one matching market.
A matching is a function µ : V → 2V satisfying the following: (m1) for all w ∈ W ,
µ(w) ⊆ F and |µ(w)| ≤ 1; (m2) for all f ∈ F , µ(f) ⊆ W and |µ(f)| ≤ qf ; and
(m3) µ(w) = {f} if and only if w ∈ µ(f). We will often write µ(w) = f instead of
µ(w) = {f}. If µ(w) = ∅, we say that w is unmatched at µ. If |µ(f)| < qf , we say that
f has qf−|µ(f)| unfilled positions at µ. LetM denote the set of all matchings. Given
P ∈ P and µ ∈ P , µ is stable (at P ) if (s1) for all v ∈ V , µ(v) ⊆ A(Pv) (individual
rationality); and (s2) there exists no pair (w, f) ∈ W × F such that fPwµ(w) and
either [wPf∅ and |µ(f)| < qf ] or [wPfw′ for some w′ ∈ µ(f)] (pairwise stability). Let
C(P ) denote the set of stable matchings at P (or the core of P ). A (direct) mechanism
is a function ϕ : P →M. A mechanism ϕ is stable if for all P ∈ P , ϕ[P ] is stable at
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P . The most popular stable mechanisms are the deferred-acceptance algorithms (DA-
algorithms) (Gale and Shapley, 1962): the firm-proposing DA-algorithm is denoted
by DAF and the worker-proposing DA-algorithm is denoted by DAW .
A mechanism matches each firm f to a set of workers, taking into account only f ’s
preference ordering Pf over individual workers. To study firms’ incentives, preference
orderings of firms over individual workers have to be extended to preference orderings
over subsets of workers. The preference extension P ∗f over 2
W is responsive to Pf ∈ Pf
if for all S ∈ 2W , all w ∈ S, and all w′ /∈ S: (r1) S ∪ {w′}P ∗f S ⇔ |S| < qf and
w′Pf∅; and (r2) (S\{w}) ∪ {w′}P ∗f S ⇔ w′Pfw. Let R∗f denote the weak preference
associated with P ∗f and resp(Pf ) denote the set of all responsive extensions of Pf .
Moreover, given S ∈ 2W , let B(S, P ∗f ) be the weak upper contour set of P ∗f at S; i.e.,
B(S, P ∗f ) = {S ′ ∈ 2W | S ′R∗fS}.
Any mechanism and any true profile define a direct (ordinal) preference revelation
game under complete information for which we can define the natural (ordinal) notion
of Nash equilibrium. We denote such a game by (P , ϕ, P ) where P is the true profile,
ϕ is a mechanism and any agent v’s set of strategies is Pv. Given a mechanism ϕ
and P, P ′ ∈ P , P ′ is a Nash equilibrium (NE) in the mechanism ϕ under complete
information P if (n1) for all w ∈ W , ϕ[P ′](w)Rwϕ[Pˆw, P ′−w](w) for all Pˆw ∈ Pw; and
(n2) for all f ∈ F and all P ∗f ∈ resp(Pf ), ϕ[P ′](f)R∗fϕ[Pˆf , P ′−f ](f) for all Pˆf ∈ Pf .
Truth-telling is a NE in ϕ under P if P is a NE in ϕ under P .
A common prior is a probability distribution P˜ over P . Given P ∈ P , let Pr{P˜ =
P} denote the probability that P˜ assigns to P . Given v ∈ V , let P˜v denote the
marginal distribution of P˜ over Pv. Given a common prior P˜ and Pv ∈ Pv, let P˜−v|Pv
denote the probability distribution which P˜ induces over P−v conditional on Pv. It
describes agent v’s (Bayesian) uncertainty about the preferences of the other agents,
given that his preference ordering is Pv.
7
7This formulation does not require symmetry nor independence of priors; conditional priors might
be very correlated if agents use similar sources to form them (i.e., rankings, grades, recommendation
letters, etc.).
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A random matching η˜ is a probability distribution over the set of matchings
M. Given µ ∈ M, let Pr{η˜ = µ} denote the probability that η˜ assigns to µ.
Let η˜(w) denote the distribution which η˜ induces over w’s set of potential part-
ners F ∪ {∅}, and let η˜(f) denote the distribution which η˜ induces over f ’s set of
potential partners 2W . Given two random matchings η˜ and η˜′, (fo1) for w ∈ W
and Pw ∈ Pw we say that η˜(w) first-order stochastically Pw−dominates η˜′(w), de-
noted by η˜ (w)P sdw η˜
′ (w), if for all v ∈ F ∪ {∅}, ∑v′∈F∪{∅}:v′Rwv Pr{η˜ (w) = v′} ≥∑
v′∈F∪{∅}:v′Rwv Pr{η˜′ (w) = v′}; and (fo2) for f ∈ F and Pf ∈ Pf , η˜(f) first-order
stochastically Pf−dominates η˜′(f), denoted by η˜ (f)P sdf η˜′ (f), if for all P ∗f ∈ resp(Pf )
and all S ∈ 2W ,8 ∑S′∈2W :S′R∗fS Pr{η˜ (f) = S ′} ≥∑S′∈2W :S′R∗fS Pr{η˜′ (f) = S ′}.9
A mechanism ϕ and a common prior P˜ define a direct (ordinal) preference rev-
elation game under incomplete information. A strategy of agent v is a function
sv : Pv → Pv specifying for each type Pv of v a list that v submits to the mechanism,
sv(Pv). We restrict our analysis to pure strategies in the main text. The Appendix
generalizes our main result to mixed strategies and random mechanisms. A strategy
profile is a list s = (sv)v∈V of strategies specifying for each true profile P a submitted
profile s(P ). Given a mechanism ϕ : P → M and a common prior P˜ over P , a
strategy profile s : P → P induces a random matching ϕ[s(P˜ )] in the following way:
for all µ ∈M,
Pr{ϕ[s(P˜ )] = µ} =
∑
P∈P:ϕ[s(P )]=µ
Pr{P˜ = P}.
Using Bayesian updating, the relevant random matching for agent v, given his type Pv
and a strategy profile s, is ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] (where s−v(P˜−v|Pv) is the probability
distribution over P−v which s−v and P˜ induce conditional on Pv).
8Observe that this definition requires that η˜ first-order stochastically dominates η˜′ according to
all responsive extensions of Pf .
9It is well-known that (fo1) is equivalent to that for any vNM-representation of Pw the expected
utility of η˜ is greater than or equal to the expected utility of η˜′ (and similarly for (fo2) and all vNM-
representations of any responsive extension of Pf ). See for instance, Theorem 3.11 in d’Aspremont
and Peleg (1988).
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Definition 4 (Ordinal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) Let P˜ be a common prior.
A strategy profile s is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium (OBNE ) in the mecha-
nism ϕ under incomplete information P˜ if and only if for all v ∈ V and all Pv ∈ Pv
such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0,10
ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)P sdv ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) for all P ′v ∈ Pv. (1)
Truth-telling is an OBNE in the mechanism ϕ under incomplete information P˜ if
and only if for all v ∈ V and all Pv ∈ Pv such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0,
ϕ[Pv, P˜−v|Pv ](v)P sdv ϕ[P ′v, P˜−v|Pv ](v) for all P ′v ∈ Pv. (2)
In general for arbitrary mechanisms there is no connection between NE under
complete information and OBNE under incomplete information. For instance, sup-
pose that the common prior P˜ u is uniform in the sense that it puts equal probability
on all preference profiles. Furthermore, suppose that the mechanism ϕ matches a
worker and a firm if and only if they rank each other as their most preferred choice
(and ϕ leaves all other positions unfilled and all other workers unmatched). Then it
is easy to verify that truth-telling is an OBNE in the mechanism ϕ under the uniform
prior P˜ u.11 However, truth-telling is not always a NE in the mechanism ϕ under com-
plete information since for some profiles, a firm may rank a worker first and a worker
the firm second, and if the worker is unmatched, then she profitably manipulates by
moving the firm to the first position of her submitted ranking. Our main result will
show that such a disconnection between NE and OBNE is only possible for unstable
mechanisms.
10In the definition of OBNE optimal behavior of agent v is only required for the preferences of v
which arise with positive probability under P˜ . If Pv ∈ Pv is such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} = 0, then the
conditional prior P˜−v|Pv cannot be derived from P˜ . However, we could complete the prior of v in
the following way: let P˜−v|Pv put probability one on a profile where all other agents submit lists
which do not contain v.
11For any agent v and any Pv ∈ Pv, P˜u−v|Pv is uniform over P−v. For all agents belonging to the
opposite side of the market, the probability that she ranks v first is identical. Hence, v cannot do
better than submitting the true preference relation.
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3 The Main Result and Its Applications
The support of a common prior P˜ is the set of profiles on which P˜ puts positive
probability: P ∈ P belongs to the support of P˜ if and only if Pr{P˜ = P} > 0.
Theorem 1 Let P˜ be a common prior, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable
mechanism. Then, s is an OBNE in ϕ under incomplete information P˜ if and only if
for any profile P in the support of P˜ , s(P ) is a Nash equilibrium in ϕ under complete
information P .
Theorem 1 has several consequences and applications. One immediate conse-
quence is that for determining whether a strategy profile is an OBNE, we only need
to check whether for each realization of the common prior the submitted preference
orderings constitute a Nash equilibrium under complete information. This means that
the uniquely relevant information for an OBNE is the support of the common prior
and no calculations of probabilities are necessary. This consequence is very important
for applications because we need to check equilibrium play only for the realized (or
observed) profiles. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, we can use properties of NE (under
complete information) to deduce characteristics of OBNE.
Observe that, given a common belief P˜ , the set of OBNE in a stable mechanism
is non-empty. For instance, imagine that the workers and the firms are divided into
“local” matching markets as follows: let (Wf )f∈F be a partition of the set of workers
(allowing Wf = ∅ for some firms f) where Wf denotes the set of workers belonging
to the “local” market of f . In words, under the following strategy profile, if worker
w belongs to the local market of firm f , then w ranks f uniquely acceptable if f is
preferred to being unmatched and otherwise w ranks no firm acceptable. Any firm f
ranks as acceptable (and in the true order) all workers which both belong to its local
market and are acceptable according to its true preference relation. Let the strategy
profile s be defined in the following way: (i) for any w ∈ W and any Pw ∈ Pw,
A(sw(Pw)) = {f} if f ∈ A(Pw) and w ∈ Wf , and A(sw(Pw)) = ∅ otherwise; and (ii)
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for all f ∈ F and all Pf ∈ Pf , let A(sf (Pf )) = A(Pf )∩Wf and sf (Pf )|A(Pf )∩Wf =
Pf |A(Pf ) ∩ Wf . Then for any stable mechanism and any profile P , s(P ) is a NE
under complete information. Hence, s is an OBNE in any stable mechanism under
any common belief. In the special case where Wf = W for some firm f , firm f has a
monopolistic market.
Restricting ourselves to truth-telling (where s(P ) = P for all P ∈ P), Theorem
1 shows that truth-telling is an OBNE in a stable mechanism ϕ if and only if for
any profile in the support of the common belief, truth-telling is a NE in ϕ under
complete information for any profile in the support of the common prior. In other
words, in many-to-one matching a stable mechanism ϕ is ordinally Bayesian incentive
compatible under the common prior P˜ if and only if ϕ restricted to the support of P˜ is
incentive compatible. Furthermore, it can be easily seen that P is a NE in the stable
mechanism ϕ under complete information P if and only if P is a NE in any stable
mechanism under complete information P . All what matters is the stability of the
mechanism (and not which specific stable matching is chosen).
While the proof of Theorem 1’s (If)-part is straightforward, its (Only if)-part
proceeds roughly as follows. If for some profile P in the support of P˜ , s(P ) does
not constitute a NE, then some agent v has a profitably deviation from s(P ) under
complete information P . Using this deviation we then construct another profitable
deviation for v from s(P ) under complete information P such that agent v strictly
increases the probability of the weak upper contour set (at his type Pv) of assigned
partner(s) of the deviation under P . This implies that strategy profile s cannot be
an OBNE. The construction and the proof use repeatedly the following peculiarities
of stable matchings in many-to-one matching markets (see Appendix A.1): (1) in-
variance of unmatched agents and unfilled positions: the set of unmatched agents
and any firm’s number of unfilled positions are the same for all stable matchings;
and (2) comparative statics: starting from any many-to-one matching market and
its workers-optimal matching, when new workers become available all firms weakly
8
prefer any matching, which is stable for the enlarged market, to the workers-optimal
stable matching of the smaller market.
Below we turn to the applications of Theorem 1.
3.1 Application I: Structure of OBNE
By Theorem 1, a strategy profile is an OBNE if and only if the agents play a Nash
equilibrium for any profile in the support of the common prior. Therefore, (a) the set
of OBNE is identical for any two common priors with equal support and (b) the set
of OBNE shrinks if the support of the common prior becomes larger. We state these
two facts as Corollary 1 below.
Corollary 1 (Invariance) Let s be a strategy profile and ϕ be a stable mechanism.
(a) Let P˜ and P˜ ′ be two common priors with equal support. Then, s is an OBNE
in the stable mechanism ϕ under P˜ if and only if s is an OBNE in the stable
mechanism ϕ under P˜ ′.
(b) Let P˜ and P˜ ′ be two common priors such that the support of P˜ ′ is contained in
the support of P˜ . If s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under P˜ , then s
is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under P˜ ′.
Now by (a) of Corollary 1, for stable mechanisms any OBNE is robust to per-
turbations of the common prior which leave its support unchanged. Therefore, any
OBNE remains an equilibrium if agents have different priors with equal support, i.e.
each agent v may have a private prior P˜ v but all private priors have identical (or
common) support.12 This consequence is especially important for applications since
for many of them, the common prior assumption might be too strong.
12Then in Definition 4 of OBNE the common prior P˜ is replaced for each agent v by his private
prior P˜ v. Theorem 1 and its proof show that, a strategy profile s is an OBNE in a stable mechanism
ϕ under private priors (P˜ v)v∈V if and only if for all v ∈ V and any profile P in the support of
P˜ v, sv(Pv) is a best response to s−v(P−v) in ϕ under complete information P . In other words,
9
By (b) of Corollary 1, the set of OBNE with full support (i.e. all common priors
which put positive probability on all profiles) is contained in the set of OBNE of any
arbitrary common prior (or support). Therefore, any OBNE for a common prior with
full support is an OBNE for any arbitrary prior. Hence, such OBNE are invariant
with respect to the common prior and remain OBNE if the agents’ priors are not
necessarily derived from the same common prior (and the “local” markets example is
an OBNE in any stable mechanism under any priors).
3.2 Application II: Truth-Telling under Correlated Prefer-
ences
In empirical applications the preferences of one side of the market are often perfectly
correlated. For example, each firm may rank all workers according to an objective
criterion such as their degree of qualifications or each college may rank all students
according to their grades. Furthermore, it is common in labor economics or search
theory to often assume that all workers have identical preferences over firms.13 One-
sided perfect correlation is an extreme case of interdependence of preferences where
an agent’s preference may depend on the preferences of the other agents on his side.
We say that a common prior P˜ is F -correlated if for any profile P in the sup-
port of P˜ , all firms have identical preferences.14 Similarly we say that a prior P˜ is
W -correlated if for any profile P in the support of P˜ , all workers have identical pref-
erences. Theorem 1 also helps us to prove the following result under F -correlated or
each agent’s strategy sv chooses a best response to the other reported preferences for any profile
belonging to the support of his private prior. If all private priors have equal support, then it follows
that a strategy profile s is an OBNE with private priors (with common support) if and only if for any
profile P in the common support, s(P ) is a Nash equilibrium in the mechanism ϕ under complete
information P .
13For instance, Shi (2002) provides a long list of papers on directed search models in labor markets
where at least one side of the market is homogenous.
14Formally this means for all f, f ′ ∈ F , A(Pf ) = A(Pf ′) and Pf |W = Pf ′ |W .
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W -correlated common priors.
Proposition 1 Let P˜ be a common prior.
(a) If P˜ is F -correlated or W -correlated, then truth-telling is an OBNE in any
stable mechanism under incomplete information P˜ .
(b) Let s be a strategy profile such that sw(Pw) = Pw for all w ∈ W and all Pw ∈
Pw. If P˜ is W -correlated and s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism DAW
under incomplete information P˜ , then for all profiles P in the support of P˜ ,
DAW [s(P )] is stable with respect to P . The analogous statement is true for the
stable mechanism DAF .
Although Proposition 1 focuses on completely correlated priors, it is easy to extend
it in the following direction. Suppose that each worker has a certain qualification and
each firm only offers positions having the same job-specific qualification. Let all
firms, which are interested in the same qualification, have identical preferences over
all workers possessing this qualification for any realization in the common prior. Then
the qualifications segregate the matching market and the conclusions of Proposition
1 apply. For example, each firm may represent a certain department in a hospital
and they would like to fill their positions with physicians who studied the medical
specialty of their department.
4 Variations
Recall for truth-telling to be an OBNE for a common belief, it must be that for any
firm and any of its realized preference over firms, truth-telling first order stochastically
dominates submitting any other ranking for all responsive extensions of the true
ranking. It is natural to ask whether Theorem 1 breaks down when we restrict the
set of responsive extensions firms may have.
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First, it is easy to see that the proof of Theorem 1 remains true if firms responsive
extensions are additive, i.e. where a firm has a numerical value for each worker and
the value of a set of workers is the sum of the values of the hired workers.15
Second, we show that Theorem 1 depends on firms having responsive extensions
which are not monotonic: given Pf ∈ Pf and P ∗f ∈ resp(Pf ), P ∗f is monotonic if for all
S, S ′ ∈ 2W such that |S ′| < |S| ≤ qf and S ⊆ A(Pf ), we have SP ∗f S ′. Let mresp(Pf )
denote the set of all monotonic responsive extensions of Pf . We will call a strategy
profile a monotonic OBNE in a mechanism under incomplete information if (fo2)
holds for all monotonic responsive extensions of any firm’s preference relation over
individual workers. In the example below we show that truth-telling is a monotonic
OBNE in DAW , while, for some preference profile P in the support of the common
belief, truth-telling is not a Nash equilibrium under complete information P in the
direct preference revelation game induced by DAW .
Example 1 Consider a many-to-one matching market with three firms F = {f1, f2, f3}
and four workers W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Firm f1 has capacity qf1 = 2 and firms f2 and
f3 have capacity qf2 = qf3 = 1. Consider the common belief P˜ with Pr{P˜ = P} = p
and Pr{P˜ = P¯} = 1− p, where 0 < p < 1/2, and P and P¯ are the following profiles:
Pf1 Pf2 Pf3 Pw1 Pw2 Pw3 Pw4 P¯f1 P¯f2 P¯f3 P¯w1 P¯w2 P¯w3 P¯w4
w1 w1 w3 f3 f2 f1 f1 w1 w2 w4 f1 f2 f1 f3
w2 w2 w1 f1 f1 f3 f2 w2
w3 w3 w2 f2 f3 f2 f3 w3
w4 w4 w4 w4
.
Note that Pf1 = P¯f1 . It is straightforward to verify that both profiles have a singleton
15A responsive preference ordering P ∗f is additive if there exists an injective function g : W →
R\{0} such that for all S, S′ ∈ 2W with |S| ≤ qf and |S′| ≤ qf , we have SP ∗f S′ ⇔
∑
w∈S g(w) >∑
w′∈S′ g(w
′). In footnotes we show that any responsive extension in the proof of Theorem 1 can
be chosen to be additive.
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core and C(P ) = {µ} and C(P¯ ) = {µ¯}, where
µ =
 f1 f2 f3
{w3, w4} w2 w1
 and µ¯ =
 f1 f2 f3
{w1, w3} w2 w4
 .
Let ϕ be a stable mechanism. Thus, by stability of ϕ, ϕ[P ] = µ and ϕ[P¯ ] = µ¯.
Claim 1: Truth-telling is not a Nash equilibrium under complete information P in
the direct preference revelation game induced by DAW .
Proof of Claim 1: Let P ′f1 ∈ Pf1 be such that P ′f1 : w1w2w4∅w3. Then C(P ′f1 , P−f1) =
{µ′} where
µ′ =
 f1 f2 f3
{w1, w4} w2 w3
 .
Hence, by stability of ϕ, ϕ[P ′f1 , P−f1 ] = µ
′. Obviously, for all responsive extensions P ∗f1
of Pf we have {w1, w4}P ∗f1{w3, w4}, which is equivalent to ϕ[P ′f1 , P−f1 ](f1)P ∗f1ϕ[P ](f1).
Therefore, truth-telling is not a Nash equilibrium in any stable mechanism ϕ under
complete information P (and profile P belongs to the support of the common belief
P˜ ). 
Claim 2: Truth-telling is a monotonic OBNE in the stable mechanism DAW under
incomplete information P˜ .
Proof of Claim 2: Note that for all v ∈ V \{f1}, if v observes his preference relation,
then v knows whether P was realized or P¯ was realized. Since at both of P and P¯
the core is a singleton and firms f2 and f3 have quota one, it follows from the proof
of Theorem 1 in Ehlers and Masso´ (2007) that v cannot gain by deviating.
Next we consider firm f1. All arguments except for the last one apply to any stable
mechanism ϕ. Observe that Pf1 = P¯f1 and the random matching ϕ[Pf1 , P˜−f1|Pf1 ]
assigns to f1 the set {w3, w4} with probability p and the set {w1, w3} with probability
1 − p. Let P ∗f1 be a monotonic responsive extension of Pf1 and P ′′f1 ∈ Pf1 . We show
that
ϕ[Pf1 , P˜−f1|Pf1 ](f1)P ∗sdf1 ϕ[P ′′f1 , P˜−f1|Pf1 ](f1). (3)
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We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: |ϕ[P ′′f1 , P−f1 ](f1)| = 1 or |ϕ[P ′′f1 , P¯−f1 ](f1)| = 1.
Now if (3) does not hold, then by monotonicity of P ∗f1 and the fact that when sub-
mitting Pf1 , f1 is assigned the set {w3, w4} with probability p and the set {w1, w3}
with probability 1− p (where 1− p > 1/2), we have that ϕ[P ′′f1 , P−f1 ](f1)P ∗f1{w1, w3}
or ϕ[P ′′f1 , P¯−f1 ](f1)P
∗
f1
{w1, w3}. Obviously, from the definition of P¯−f1 , the last is
impossible. Thus, ϕ[P ′′f1 , P−f1 ](f1)P
∗
f1
{w1, w3} and, by responsiveness of P ∗f1 , we
have ϕ[P ′′f1 , P−f1 ](f1) = {w1, w2}. But then, without loss of generality, we would
have DAF [P
′′
f1
, P−f1 ](f1) = {w1, w2} (because DAF chooses the most preferred sta-
ble matching from the firms’ point of view).16 Since we have C(P ) = {µ} and
DAF [Pf1 , P−f1 ](f1) = {w3, w4}, this would imply that in the corresponding one-to-
one matching problem DAF is group manipulable by the two copies of f1 (with each
copy gaining strictly), a contradiction to the result of Dubins and Freedman (1981).17
Case 2: |ϕ[P ′′f1 , P−f1 ](f1)| = 2 and |ϕ[P ′′f1 , P¯−f1 ](f1)| = 2.
Then by definition of P¯−f1 and |ϕ[P ′′f1 , P¯−f1 ](f1)| = 2, we have ϕ[P ′′f1 , P¯−f1 ](f1) =
{w1, w3}. Thus, by stability of ϕ, {w1, w3} ⊆ A(P ′′f1). We consider two subcases.
Subcase 2.1: For all µ′′ ∈ C(P ′′f1 , P−f1), µ′′(w4) = ∅.
Then w4 /∈ A(P ′′f1) and by definition of P−f1 and w3 ∈ A(P ′′f1), DAW [P ′′f1 , P−f1 ](f1) =
{w3}. Then f1 does not fill all its positions at the workers-optimal matching and by
Roth and Sotomayor (1990), f1 is matched to the same set of workers at all stable
matchings. Hence, ϕ[P ′′f1 , P−f1 ](f1) = {w3} and (3) holds (because when submit-
ting P ′′f1 , firm f1 is matched with probability p to w3 and with probability 1 − p to
{w1, w3}).
16If DAF [P
′′
f1
, P−f1 ](f1) 6= {w1, w2}, then choose P ′′′f1 such that A(P ′′′f1 ) = {w1, w2}. Then we
obtain DAF [P
′′′
f1
, P−f1 ](f1) = {w1, w2}.
17Their result says that in a one-to-one matching market no group of firms can profitably ma-
nipulate DAF at the true profile under complete information (with strict preference holding for all
firms belonging to the group).
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Subcase 2.2: For some µ′′ ∈ C(P ′′f1 , P−f1), µ′′(w4) 6= ∅.
Then by definition of P−f1 , µ
′′(w4) = f1; otherwise the pair (w2, f2) would block
µ′′ at (P ′′f1 , P−f1) if µ
′′(w4) = f2 and the pair (w1, f3) would block µ′′ at (P ′′f1 , P−f1) if
µ′′(w4) = f3. Thus, by {w3, w4} ⊆ A(P ′′f1), µ ∈ C(P ′′f1 , P−f1) and DAW [P ′′f1 , P−f1 ] = µ.
Hence, (3) holds for the stable mechanism DAW .
18 
The above example has another important implication: suppose that firms submit
preference orderings over sets of workers instead of submitting preference orderings
over individual workers only and the common belief is a distribution over profiles
where firms’ preference orderings are over sets of workers. Now if the common belief
puts only positive probability on profiles where all firms’ preference orderings are
responsive and monotonic, then the above example shows that truth-telling can be
an OBNE while not necessarily at all profiles in the support truth-telling is a NE
under complete information.
This is partly due to the fact our main result is a statement for any common belief.
Once we put certain conditions on the common belief, our main result continues to
hold even if firms submit preference orderings over sets of workers. Without going into
details, let P∗f denote the set of all responsive preference orderings of f over 2W and
P∗ = (×f∈FP∗f ) × (×w∈WPw). Let the common belief P˜ ∗ on P∗ be such that for all
P ∗−f ∈ P∗−f and all Pf , P ′f ∈ P∗f such that Pf |W∪{∅} = P ′f |W∪{∅}, Pr{P˜ ∗ = (Pf , P ∗−f )} >
0⇔ Pr{P˜ ∗ = (P ′f , P ∗−f )} > 0. In words, if whenever the common belief puts positive
probability on some profile, then for any firm and any other preference ordering
which is responsive to the same ordering, the belief also puts positive probability on
the profile where the firm’s preference is replaced by this preference ordering (the
support of the common belief does not distinguish preference orderings which are
18Note that Example 1 does not contradict Theorem 1. When considering the non-monotonic
extension P ∗f1 such that {w1}P ∗f1{w3, w4}, then firm w1 can gain by submitting the list Pˆf1
where worker w1 is the unique acceptable worker (i.e. A(Pˆf1) = {w1}). Then we have both
ϕ[Pˆf1 , P−f1 ](f1) = {w1} and ϕ[Pˆf1 , P¯−f1 ](f1) = {w1}, which means that truth-telling is not an
OBNE in any stable mechanism ϕ under incomplete information P˜ .
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responsive to the same ordering over individual workers). The proof of Theorem 1
then shows that truth-telling is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ if and only if
for any profile in the support of P˜ ∗, truth-telling is a NE in the stable mechanism
under complete information.
It would be interesting to identify other economic environments where a similar
link between BNE under incomplete information and NE under complete information
holds. In those environments the strategic analysis under complete information is
essential to undertake the corresponding analysis under incomplete information.
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APPENDIX
Before we prove Theorem 1, we recall the following properties of the core of
a many-to-one matching market. These properties will be used frequently in the
proof. It will be convenient to write (F,W,P ; q) for any many-to-one matching mar-
ket (F,W, q, P ) in which qf = 1 for all f ∈ F .
A.1 Properties of the Core
The core of a many-to-one matching market has a special structure. The following
well-known properties will be useful in the sequel:19
(P1) For each profile P ∈ P , C(P ) contains two stable matchings, the firms-optimal
stable matching µF and the workers-optimal stable matching µW , with the property
that for all µ ∈ C(P ), µW (w)Rwµ(w)RwµF (w) for all w ∈ W , and for all f ∈ F ,
µF (f)R
∗
fµ(f)R
∗
fµW (f) for all P
∗
f ∈ resp(Pf ). The deferred-acceptance algorithms
(DA-algorithms) (Gale and Shapley, 1962) are denoted by DAF : P → M and
DAW : P →M: for all P ∈ P , DAF [P ] = µF and DAW [P ] = µW .
(P2) For each profile P ∈ P and any responsive extensions P ∗F = (P ∗f )f∈F of PF =
(Pf )f∈F , C(P ) coincides with the set of group stable matchings at (PW , P ∗F ), where
group stability corresponds to the usual cooperative game theoretical notion of weak
blocking.20 This means that the set of group stable matchings (relative to P ) is
invariant with respect to any specific responsive extensions of PF .
(P3) For each P ∈ P , the set of unmatched agents is the same for all stable matchings
(see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorems 5.12 and 5.13): for all µ, µ′ ∈ C(P ), and
for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F , (i) if µ(w) = ∅, then µ′(w) = ∅; (ii) |µ(f)| = |µ′(f)|; and
(iii) if |µ(f)| < qf , then µ(f) = µ′(f).
19See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a detailed presentation of these properties.
20A matching µ is weakly blocked by coalition S ⊆ V under (PW , P ∗F ) if there exists a matching
µ′ such that (b1) for all v ∈ S, µ′(v) ⊆ S, (b2) for all w ∈ W ∩ S, µ′(w)Rwµ(w), and (b3) for all
f ∈ F ∩ S, µ′(f)R∗fµ(f), with strict preference holding for at least one v ∈ S.
20
(P4) Consider a one-to-one matching market (F,W,P ; q) and suppose that new work-
ers enter the market. Let (F,W ′, P ′; q) be this new one-to-one matching market where
W ⊆ W ′ and P ′ agrees with P over F and W . Let DAW [P ] = µW . Then, for all
f ∈ F , µ′(f)R′fµW (f) for all µ′ ∈ C(F,W ′, P ′; q) (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985; Craw-
ford, 1991).
(P5) Given (F,W, q, P ), split each firm f into qf identical copies of itself (all having
the same preference ordering Pf ) and let F
′ be this new set of
∑
f∈F qf split firms.
Set q′f ′ = 1 for all f
′ ∈ F ′ and replace f by its copies in F ′ (always in the same
order) in each worker’s preference relation Pw. Then, (F
′,W, P ; q′) is a one-to-one
matching market for which we can uniquely identify its matchings with the match-
ings of the original many-to-one matching market (F,W, q, P ), and vice versa (Roth
and Sotomayor, 1990, Lemma 5.6). Then, and using this identification, we write
C(F,W, q, P ) = C(F ′,W, P ; q′).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Below we extend our result to random stable mechanisms21 and mixed strategies.
Let ∆(M) denote the set of all probability distributions over M. A random
mechanism is a function ϕ˜ : P → ∆(M) choosing for each profile P ∈ P a distribution
ϕ˜[P ] over M. The random mechanism ϕ˜ is stable if for all P ∈ P , the support of
ϕ˜[P ] is contained in C(P ). Given v ∈ V , let ∆(Pv) denote the set of all probability
distributions over Pv. A mixed strategy of agent v is a function mv : Pv → ∆(Pv)
specifying for each type Pv of v a distribution mv(Pv) over Pv. A (mixed) strategy
profile is a list m = (mv)v∈V .
Given a random mechanism ϕ˜, P ∈ P , and m, m(P ) is a NE (in mixed strategies)
in ϕ˜ under complete information P (i.e. m(P ) is a NE in (P , ϕ˜, P )) if for all v ∈ V
and all P ′v ∈ Pv, ϕ˜[m(P )](v)P sdv ϕ˜[P ′v,m−v(P−v)](v).22
21Pais (2008) provides a strategic analysis of random stable mechanisms under complete informa-
tion.
22Note that implicitly here we use the fact that under complete information a mixed strategy is a
21
Definition 5 (OBNE in mixed strategies) Let P˜ be a common prior. A mixed
strategy profile m is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium (OBNE ) in the random
mechanism ϕ˜ under incomplete information P˜ if and only if for all v ∈ V and all
Pv ∈ Pv such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0,
ϕ˜[mv(Pv),m−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)P sdv ϕ˜[uv,m−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) for all uv ∈ ∆(Pv). (4)
As usual, if s is an OBNE in pure strategies in the (deterministic) mechanism ϕ under
P˜ , then s is an OBNE in mixed strategies in the mechanism ϕ (where ϕ is a random
mechanism putting probability one on a unique matching for each profile).
Theorem 2 Let P˜ be a common prior, m be a mixed strategy profile, and ϕ˜ be a
random stable mechanism. Then, m is an OBNE in ϕ˜ under incomplete information
P˜ if and only if for any profile P in the support of P˜ , m(P ) is a Nash equilibrium in
ϕ˜ under complete information P .
Proof. Let P˜ be a common prior, m be a mixed strategy profile and ϕ˜ be a random
stable mechanism. For any probability distribution D we denote by supp(D) its
support (and e.g., supp(P˜ ) is the support of P˜ ).
(⇐) Suppose that for any profile P in the support of P˜ , m(P ) is a Nash equilibrium
in the mechanism ϕ˜ under complete information P . Let v ∈ V and Pv ∈ Pv be such
that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0. By the previous fact, then we have for all P ′v ∈ Pv and all
P−v ∈ P−v such that Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P−v} > 0, ϕ˜[m(P )](v)P sdv ϕ˜[P ′v,m−v(P−v)](v) for
all P ′v ∈ Pv. Hence,
ϕ˜[mv(Pv),m−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)P sdv ϕ˜[P ′v,m−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v),
and for any uv ∈ ∆(Pv),
ϕ˜[mv(Pv),m−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)P sdv ϕ˜[uv,m−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v).
best response (in the set of all mixed strategies) if and only if the mixed strategy is weakly better
than any pure strategy P ′v ∈ Pv.
22
Hence, m is an OBNE in mixed strategies in ϕ˜ under P˜ , the desired conclusion.
(⇒) Let m be an OBNE in mixed strategies in the random stable mechanism ϕ˜ under
P˜ .
First we show that for all P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0,
µ(v) ⊆ A(Pv) for all v ∈ V and all µ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[m(P )]). (5)
If for some P in the support of P˜ , for some v ∈ V , and some µ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[m(P )]),
µ(v) 6⊆ A(Pv), then let agent v choose Pv instead of mv(Pv). By stability of ϕ˜, we
have µ′(v) ⊆ A(Pv) for all P ′−v ∈ P−v and all µ′ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[Pv,m−v(P ′−v)]). Let v ∈ F
(the case v ∈ W is analogous and easier). We choose a responsive extension P ∗v of
Pv such that for all W
′ ∈ 2W with |W ′| ≤ qv, W ′R∗v∅ if and only if W ′ ⊆ A(Pv).23
Hence, by µ(v) 6⊆ A(Pv), µ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[m(P )]), and Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P−v} > 0, it follows
that
Pr{ϕ˜[Pv,m−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) ∈ B(∅, P ∗v )} = 1 > Pr{ϕ˜[mv(Pv),m−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) ∈ B(∅, P ∗v )},
which means that m is not an OBNE in the random stable mechanism ϕ˜ under P˜ , a
contradiction. Hence, (5) holds.
Second, suppose that for some P ∈ supp(P˜ ), m(P ) is not a NE in ϕ˜ under P .
Then, without loss of generality, there exist f ∈ F and P ′f ∈ Pf such that
ϕ˜[m(P )](f) 6P sdf ϕ˜[P ′f ,m−f (P−f )](f).
Then there exists a responsive extension P ∗f of Pf and P
′
−f ∈ supp(m−f (P−f )) such
that for some µ′ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[P ′f , P ′−f ]) and µ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[mf (Pf ), P ′−f ]) we have
µ′(f)P ∗f µ(f). (6)
23The responsive extension P ∗v of Pv can be chosen to be additive by selecting g : W → R\{0}
such that (i) for all w,w′ ∈ W , wPvw′ ⇔ g(w) > g(w′), (ii) for all w ∈ A(Pv), g(w) ∈ (0, 1), and
(iii) for all w ∈ W\A(Pv), g(w) < −|W |. It is easy to see that for all W ′ ∈ 2W with |W ′| ≤ qv,∑
w′∈W ′ g(w
′) ≥ 0⇔W ′ ⊆ A(Pv).
23
The case where a worker has a profitable deviation is analogous to the case where a
firm with quota one has a profitable deviation.
Let µ′(f) = {w′1, w′2, . . . , w′|µ′(f)|} where w′1Pfw′2Pf · · ·Pfw′|µ′(f)| and µ(f) = {w1, w2,
. . . , w|µ(f)|} where w1Pfw2Pf · · ·Pfw|µ(f)|. We now construct from P ′f another de-
viation P ′′f and from µ
′(f) both a responsive extension P ∗∗f of Pf and a subset
of workers W ∗, and prove that the random matching ϕ˜[mf (Pf ),m−f (P˜−f |Pf )] does
not first-order stochastically Pf -dominate the random matching ϕ˜[P
′′
f ,m−f (P˜−f |Pf )]
since Pr{ϕ˜[P ′′f ,m−f (P˜−f |Pf )](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗∗f )} > Pr{ϕ˜[mf (Pf ),m−f (P˜−f |Pf )](f) ∈
B(W ∗, P ∗∗f )}. We proceed by distinguishing between two mutually exclusive cases.
Case 1: There exists k ∈ {1, . . . , |µ′(f)|} such that w′kPfwk and wlRfw′l for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
Note that w′k ∈ A(Pf ) because w′kPfwk and by (5), wk ∈ µ(f) ⊆ A(Pf ). Let
P ′′f ∈ Pf be such that A(P ′′f ) = B(w′k, Pf ) and P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ).
First we show that for all µ′′ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[P ′′f , P ′−f ]), µ′′(f) contains at least k workers.
Note that any profile implicitly specifies the set of agents of the matching problem.
For the time being, below we specify both the profile and the quota of the matching
problem.
Because ϕ˜ is stable and µ′ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[P ′f , P ′−f ]), µ′ ∈ C(P ′f , P ′−f ; q). Let µ′′ be the
matching for the problem (F,W\{w′k+1, . . . , w′|µ′(f)|}, (k, q−f ), (P ′f , P ′−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|µ′(f)|}))
such that µ′′(f) = {w′1, . . . , w′k} and µ′′(f ′) = µ′(f ′) for all f ′ ∈ F\{f}. Then from
µ′ ∈ C(P ′f , P ′−f ; q) it follows that
µ′′ ∈ C(P ′f , P ′−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|µ′(f)|}; k, q−f ). (7)
By our choice of P ′′f , we have µ
′′(f) ⊆ A(P ′′f ) and P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ). Hence, we
also have by (7),
µ′′ ∈ C(P ′′f , P ′−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|µ′(f)|}; k, q−f ). (8)
Thus, by µ′′(f) = {w′1, . . . , w′k} and the fact that any firm is matched to the same
number of workers under all stable matchings, firm f is matched to k workers for all
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matchings belonging to C(P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; k, q−f ). Now if firm f is matched
to fewer than k workers in some matching belonging to C(P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; q),
then this matching is also stable for the problem (P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; k, q−f ), a
contradiction to the previous fact. Hence, f is matched to at least k workers in any sta-
ble matching belonging to C(P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; q). Now when considering the
workers-optimal matching in this core, we may split firm f into qf copies (all having
the same preference P ′′f ) and each copy of firm f weakly prefers according to P
′′
f any
matching in C(P ′′f , P
′
−f ; q) to this matching. Since at least k copies of f are matched
to a worker under the workers-optimal matching in C(P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; q),
at least k copies of f must be also matched to a worker under any stable match-
ing in C(P ′′f , P
′
−f ; q). Therefore, by supp(ϕ˜[P
′′
f , P
′
−f ]) ⊆ C(P ′′f , P ′−f ; q), for all µ′′ ∈
supp(ϕ˜[P ′′f , P
′
−f ]), µ
′′(f) contains at least k workers.
Second we choose a responsive extension P ∗∗f of Pf . Let W
∗ ⊆ B(w′k, Pf ) be
such that W ∗ consists of the k lowest ranked workers (according to Pf ) in the set
B(w′k, Pf ), i.e. |W ∗| = k and for all w ∈ B(w′k, Pf )\W ∗ and all w∗ ∈ W ∗, wPfw∗. Let
P ∗∗f be the responsive extension of Pf be such that for all W
′′ ∈ 2W , W ′′R∗∗f W ∗ if and
only if the following three conditions hold: (i) W ′′ ⊆ A(Pf ), (ii) k ≤ |W ′′| ≤ qf , and
(iii) if W ′′ = {w′′1 , w′′2 , . . . , w′′|W ′′|} where w′′1Pf · · ·Pfw′′|W ′′| and W ∗ = {w∗1, . . . , w∗k}
where w∗1Pf · · ·Pfw∗k, then w′′l Rfw∗l for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}.24 Since for all µ′′ ∈
supp(ϕ˜[P ′′f , P
′
−f ]), µ
′′(f) contains at least k workers and A(P ′′f ) = B(w
′
k, Pf ), our
construction implies that for all µ′′ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[P ′′f , P ′−f ]), µ′′(f)P ∗∗f µ(f). More pre-
cisely, for Case 1 the set µ(f) violates (iii) and our choice of P ∗∗f and W
∗ yields for
all µ′′ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[P ′′f , P ′−f ]),
µ′′(f)R∗∗f W
∗P ∗∗f µ(f) (9)
24The responsive extension P ∗∗f of Pf can be chosen to be additive by selecting g : W → R\{0} such
that (a) for all w,w′ ∈W , wPfw′ ⇔ g(w) > g(w′), (b) for all w ∈ B(w′k, Pf ), g(w) ∈ [|W |, |W |+ 1],
(c) for all w ∈ A(Pf )\B(w′k, Pf ), g(w) ∈ (0, 1), and (d) for all w ∈ W\A(Pf ), g(w) < −|W |2. It is
easy to see that for all W ′′ ∈ 2W with |W ′′| ≤ qf ,
∑
w′∈W ′′ g(w
′) ≥ ∑w∈W∗ g(w) ⇔ (i)-(iii) hold
for W ′′.
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and µ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[mf (Pf ), P ′−f ]).
The following claim will be the key to the proof. We show that for any profile,
if some stable matching is weakly preferred to W ∗ under P ∗∗f , then all matchings,
which are stable under the profile where f ’s preference ordering is replaced by P ′′f ,
are weakly preferred to W ∗ under P ∗∗f .
Claim: Let Pˆ ∈ P . If for some µˆ ∈ C(Pˆ ), µˆ(f)R∗∗f W ∗, then for all µ¯ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ),
µ¯(f)R∗∗f W
∗.
Proof of Claim: By µˆ(f)R∗∗f W
∗ and our choice of P ∗∗f ,
µˆ(f) ∩B(w′k, Pf ) contains at least k workers. (10)
If for some µ¯′ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ), µ¯′(f) contains at least k workers, then all these workers
belong to B(w′k, Pf ) because A(P
′′
f ) = B(w
′
k, Pf ). Thus, by our choice of P
∗∗
f and
W ∗, µ¯′(f)R∗∗f W
∗. Because by (P3), f is matched to at least k workers in any sta-
ble matching belonging to C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ) and A(P
′′
f ) = B(w
′
k, Pf ), it follows from our
construction that µ¯(f)R∗∗f W
∗ for all µ¯ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ), the desired conclusion.
Suppose that for all µ¯ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ), µ¯(f) contains fewer than k workers. Let
µˆ(f) = {wˆ1, . . . , wˆ|µˆ(f)|} where wˆ1Pf · · ·Pf wˆ|µˆ(f)|. By (10), µˆ(f) ∩B(w′k, Pf ) contains
at least k workers. Thus, k ≤ |µˆ(f)|. For the time being, below we specify both the
profile and the quota of the matching problem. Then we have µˆ ∈ C(Pˆ ; q). Let µˆ′ be
the matching for the problem (F,W\{wˆk+1, . . . , wˆ|µˆ(f)|}, (k, q−f ), (Pˆf , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}))
such that µˆ′(f) = {wˆ1, . . . , wˆk} and µˆ′(f ′) = µˆ(f ′) for all f ′ ∈ F\{f}. Then, from
µˆ ∈ C(Pˆf , Pˆ−f ; q) it follows that
µˆ′ ∈ C(Pˆf , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; k, q−f ). (11)
Let wˆ ∈ µˆ′(f) be such that µˆ′(f) ⊆ B(wˆ, Pˆf ) (in other words, wˆ is the worker who
is least preferred in µˆ′(f) according to Pˆf ). Let P˙f ∈ Pf be such that A(P˙f ) =
B(wˆk, Pf )∩B(wˆ, Pˆf ) and P˙f |A(P˙f ) = P ′′f |A(P˙f ). Note that µˆ′(f) ⊆ A(P˙f ). Then we
have µˆ′ ∈ C(P˙f , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; k, q−f ): first, note that µˆ′ is individually rational
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because both µˆ′(f) ⊆ B(wˆk, Pf ) and µˆ′(f) ⊆ B(wˆ, Pˆf ) (by our choice of wˆ); second,
if there would exist a blocking pair for µˆ′, then by (11) and the fact that only firm f ’s
preference changed from Pˆf to P˙f , firm f needs to be part of this blocking pair; third,
if (w, f) blocks µˆ′ under (P˙f , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; k, q−f ), then w /∈ µˆ′(f); now this
implies w 6= wˆ ∈ µˆ′(f), and w ∈ A(P˙f ) = B(wˆk, Pf ) ∩ B(wˆ, Pˆf ); but then we have
wPˆf wˆ (because wˆ is the least preferred worker in µˆ
′(f) and A(P˙f ) ⊆ B(wˆ, Pˆf )) and
(w, f) also blocks µˆ′ under (Pˆf , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; k, q−f ), a contradiction to (11).
Thus, since |µˆ′(f)| = k, firm f is matched to k workers for all matchings be-
longing to C(P˙f , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; k, q−f ). Now if firm f is matched to fewer than
k workers for some µ˜ ∈ C(P˙f , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; q), then µ˜ is also stable under
(P˙f , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; k, q−f ), a contradiction to the previous fact. Hence, f is
matched to at least k workers in any stable matching belonging to
C(P˙f , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; q). Now when considering the workers-optimal matching
in this core, we may split firm f into qf copies (all having the same preference P˙f )
and each copy of firm f weakly prefers according to P˙f any matching in C(P˙f , Pˆ−f ; q)
to this matching. Since at least k copies of f are matched to a worker under the
workers-optimal matching in C(P˙f , Pˆ−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|µˆ(f)|}; q), on the one hand
at least k copies of f are matched to a worker in any matching in C(P˙f , Pˆ−f ; q).
(12)
On the other hand, for all µ¯ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ), µ¯(f) contains fewer than k workers.
Let µ˜ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ). Let µ˜′ be the matching for the problem (F,W\(µ˜(f)\A(P˙f )), q,
(P ′′f , Pˆ−{f}∪(µ˜(f)\A(P˙f )))) such that µ˜
′(f) = µ˜(f)∩A(P˙f ) and µ˜′(f ′) = µ˜(f ′) for all f ′ ∈
F\{f}. Since µ˜ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ; q) and µ˜(f) contains fewer than qf workers, we have
µ˜′ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−{f}∪(µ˜(f)\A(P˙f )); q). Thus, by µ˜′(f) ⊆ A(P˙f ) and P˙f |A(Pˆf ) = P ′′f |A(P˙f ),
we also obtain µ˜′ ∈ C(P˙f , Pˆ−{f}∪(µ˜(f)\A(P˙f )); q). Hence, in any matching belonging to
this core firm f is matched to |µ˜′(f)| = |µ˜(f)∩A(P˙f )| workers. Now when considering
the workers-optimal matching in this core, we may split each firm f ′ ∈ F\{f} into
qf ′ copies (all having the same preference Pˆf ′) and each copy of firm f
′ weakly prefers
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according to Pˆf ′ any matching in C(P˙f , Pˆ−f ; q) to this matching. Thus, in total all
the copies of all firms f ′ ∈ F\{f} receive at least the same number of workers in
C(P˙f , Pˆ−f ; q) as they did previously. Since exactly |µ˜(f)\A(P˙f )| new workers are
available and f was matched to |µ˜′(f)| = |µ˜(f)∩A(P˙f )| workers before, firm f can be
matched to at most |µ˜(f)| workers under any stable matching in C(P˙f , Pˆ−f ; q). Since
|µ˜(f)| < k, this contradicts (12) and the fact that under responsive preferences, firm
f is matched to the same number of workers for any two matchings in C(P˙f , Pˆ−f ; q).
Hence, for µ¯ ∈ C(P ′′f , Pˆ−f ), µ¯(f) cannot contain fewer than k workers. 
Because ϕ˜ is stable, the Claim implies that for all Pˆ ∈ P ,
Pr{ϕ˜[Pˆf , Pˆ−f ](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗f )} ≤ Pr{ϕ˜[P ′′f , Pˆ−f ](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗f )}.
Thus,
Pr{ϕ˜[Pˆf ,m−f (P˜−f |Pf )](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗f )} ≤ Pr{ϕ˜[P ′′f ,m−f (P˜−f |Pf )](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗f )}.
By (9), there exists P˙f ∈ supp(mf (Pf )) such that µ ∈ supp(ϕ˜[P˙f , P ′−f ]). Thus, by
µ′(f)R∗∗f W
∗P ∗∗f µ(f) and µ
′ ∈ C(P ′′f , P ′−f ), (9) implies
Pr{ϕ˜[P˙f , P ′−f ](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗f )} < Pr{ϕ˜[P ′′f , P ′−f ](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗f )}.
Hence, bymf (Pf ) ∈ ∆(Pf ) and both P˙f ∈ supp(mf (Pf )) and P ′−f ∈ supp(m−f (P˜−f |Pf )),
Pr{ϕ˜[mf (Pf ),m−f (P˜−f |Pf )](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗f )} < Pr{ϕ˜[P ′′f ,m−f (P˜−f |Pf )](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗f )},
which means that m is not an OBNE in ϕ˜ under P˜ .
Case 2: Otherwise.
Then we have wlRfw
′
l for all l ∈ {1, . . . ,min{|µ(f)|, |µ′(f)|}}. Let k = |µ(f)|. If
|µ′(f)| ≤ |µ(f)|, then by responsiveness of P ∗f and µ(f) ⊆ A(Pf ), we have µ(f)R∗fµ′(f),
which contradicts (6). Hence, we have |µ′(f)| > |µ(f)| = k, qf > k, and w′k+1 ∈
A(Pf ). Let P
′′
f ∈ Pf be such that A(P ′′f ) = B(w′k+1, Pf ) and P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ).
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Since µ(f) ⊆ B(w′k+1, Pf ) = A(P ′′f ) and µ(f) does not fill the quota of firm f , we
have µ ∈ C(P ′′f , P ′−f ; q). Hence, on the one hand
firm f is matched to k workers under any matching in C(P ′′f , P
′
−f ; q). (13)
On the other hand, let µ′′ be the matching for the problem (F,W\{w′k+2, . . . , w′|µ′(f)|}, (k+
1, q−f ), (P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
)) such that µ′′(f) = {w′1, . . . , w′k+1} and µ′′(f ′) =
µ′(f ′) for all f ′ ∈ F\{f}. Then from µ′ ∈ C(P ′f , P ′−f ; q) it follows that µ′′ ∈
C(P ′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; k + 1, q−f ). Thus, by µ′′(f) ⊆ B(w′k+1, Pf ) = A(P ′′f )
and P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ), µ′′ ∈ C(P ′′f , P ′−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|µ′(f)|}; k + 1, q−f ). Now if
firm f is matched to fewer than k + 1 workers in some matching belonging to
C(P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; q), then this matching is also stable for the problem
(P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; k+1, q−f ), a contradiction to the previous fact. Hence, f is
matched to at least k + 1 workers in any stable matching belonging to
C(P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; q). Now when considering the workers-optimal matching
in this core, we may split firm f into qf copies (all having the same preference P
′′
f ) and
each copy of firm f weakly prefers according to P ′′f any matching in C(P
′′
f , P
′
−f ; q)
to this matching. Since at least k + 1 copies of f are matched to a worker under
the workers-optimal matching in C(P ′′f , P
′
−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|µ′(f)|}
; q), at least k + 1 copies
of f must be also matched to a worker under any matching in C(P ′′f , P
′
−f ; q), which
contradicts (13) and the fact that firm f is matched to the same number of workers
under any matching in C(P ′′f , P
′
−f ; q). Hence, Case 2 cannot occur. 
Theorem 1 is a corollary of Theorem 2 by restricting Theorem 2 and its proof to
pure strategies and deterministic mechanisms.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 Let P˜ be a common prior.
(a) If P˜ is F -correlated or W -correlated, then truth-telling is an OBNE in any
stable mechanism under incomplete information P˜ .
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(b) Let s be a strategy profile such that sw(Pw) = Pw for all w ∈ W and all Pw ∈
Pw. If P˜ is W -correlated and s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism DAW
under incomplete information P˜ , then for all profiles P in the support of P˜ ,
DAW [s(P )] is stable with respect to P . The analogous statement is true for the
stable mechanism DAF .
Proof. (a) Let ϕ be a stable mechanism and P˜ be a common prior. Without loss
of generality, let P˜ be F -correlated. The case where P˜ is W -correlated is analogous
to the case where P˜ is F -correlated and all firms have quota 1. Let P be in the
support of P˜ . Because all firms’ preferences are identical at P , we have |C(P )| = 1,
say C(P ) = {µ}. By stability of ϕ, ϕ[P ] = µ. By Theorem 1, it suffices to show that
P is a NE in the mechanism ϕ under complete information P .
Because all firms have identical preferences, say Pf : w1w2 · · ·wk∅wk+1 · · · for all
f ∈ F , µ(w1) is w1’s most preferred firm (if any) under Pw1 . Then µ(w2) is w2’s most
preferred firm (if any) from F\{µ(w1)} under Pw2 , and in general for i = 1, . . . , |W |,
µ(wi) is wi’s most preferred firm (if any) from F\{µ(w1), . . . , µ(wi−1)} under Pwi . By
stability of ϕ, obviously no worker can profitably manipulate.
Let f ∈ F , P ′f ∈ Pf , and µ′ = ϕ[P ′f , P−f ]. Suppose that for some P ∗f ∈ resp(Pf ) we
have µ′(f)P ∗f µ(f). Hence, µ
′(f) 6= µ(f). By stability of ϕ, without loss of generality
we may suppose A(P ′f ) = µ
′(f) and because any firm’s set of acceptable workers is
{w1, . . . , wk}, A(P ′f ) ⊆ A(Pf ). Again, by stability of ϕ, µ(f) ⊆ A(Pf ). First, suppose
that |µ′(f)| > |µ(f)|. Note that µ ∈ C(P ) and µ′ ∈ C(P ′f , P−f ). Then, without loss
of generality, we may suppose |µ′(f)| = qf .25 Let P ′′f ∈ Pf be such that A(P ′′f ) =
A(Pf ) and P
′′
f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ). By |µ(f)| < qf , A(P ′′f ) = A(Pf ) and (P3), we
obtain µ ∈ C(P ′′f , P−f ). By |µ(f)| 6= |µ′(f)| and (P3), we have µ′ /∈ C(P ′′f , P−f ).
Thus, µ′ is blocked by some pair (w′, f ′) under (P ′′f , P−f ). By µ
′ ∈ C(P ′f , P−f ) and
25If |µ′(f)| < qf , then set q′f = |µ′(f)|. From (P3) (where we specify both the profile and the
quotas), µ ∈ C(P ; q) and |µ(f)| < q′f imply µ ∈ C(P ; q′f , q−f ), and similarly µ′ ∈ C(P ′f , P−f ; q) and
µ′(f) = A(P ′f ) imply µ
′ ∈ C(P ′f , P−f ; q′f , q−f ).
30
A(P ′f ) ⊆ A(P ′′f ), we have f ′ = f and w′ /∈ µ′(f). But then by A(P ′f ) = µ′(f) and
P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ), we have wPfw′ for all w ∈ µ′(f). Now f has an unfilled slot
under µ′ and |µ′(f)| < qf , a contradiction.
Hence, |µ′(f)| ≤ |µ(f)|. Let w be the least Pf -preferred worker in µ(f), i.e. wRfw
for all w ∈ µ(f). If for all w ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f) we have wPfw, then by |µ′(f)| ≤ |µ(f)|
and responsiveness of P ∗f , we have µ(f)R
∗
fµ
′(f), a contradiction. Let wl ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f)
be such that wlPfw. We show that there exists an index i(l) < l such that wi(l) ∈
µ(f)\µ′(f). Let µ(wl) = fl. Note that by fl 6= f , wlPfw and µ ∈ C(P ) we have
flPwlf . Thus, by µ
′ ∈ C(P ′f , P−f ), we have |µ′(fl)| = qfl and wPflwl for all w ∈
µ′(fl). But then wl’s position at firm fl is filled with some new worker w′, i.e. w′ ∈
µ′(fl)\µ(fl) and w′Pflwl. Now by µ ∈ C(P ) and µ(wl) = fl, µ(w′)Pw′fl. If µ(w′) = f ,
then w′ has an index i(l) < l such that w′ = wi(l) and wi(l) ∈ µ(f)\µ′(f). Otherwise,
let µ(w′) = f ′ 6= f . Then again as above from f ′Pw′fl we have |µ′(f ′)| = qf ′ and
wPf ′w
′ for all w ∈ µ′(f ′), and w′’s position at firm f ′ is filled with some new worker
w′′, i.e. w′′ ∈ µ′(f ′)\µ(f ′) and w′′Pf ′w′. By P ′−f = P−f and the finiteness of W
and F , in the end for wl ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f) there exists wi(l) ∈ µ(f)\µ′(f) with i(l) < l.
Furthermore, from the above arguments, we can choose i(l) 6= i(l′) for all l 6= l′ such
that wl, wl′ ∈ µ′(f)\µ(f). Since µ(f) ⊆ A(Pf ) and |µ′(f)| ≤ |µ(f)|, responsiveness of
P ∗f implies µ(f)R
∗
fµ
′(f), a contradiction.
(b) Let P be in the support of P˜ . Since sw(Pw) = Pw for all w and P˜ is W -
correlated, we have by (a) that no worker can gain by manipulation. Furthermore,
by Theorem 1, s(P ) must be a NE in DAW under P . Because P˜ is W -correlated, all
workers have identical preferences, say Pw : f1f2 · · · fl∅fl+1 · · · for all w ∈ W . Suppose
that DAW [s(P )] is not stable with respect to P . Since s(P ) is a NE in DAW under P ,
no agent is matched to any partner under DAW [s(P )] which is unacceptable accord-
ing to its true preference relation. Suppose that some unmatched worker-firm pair
(w, f) blocks DAW [s(P )]. Then f ∈ A(Pw) and by sw(Pw) = Pw, fPwDAW [s(P )](w).
But then, along the DAW -algorithm which produces DAW [s(P )], worker w proposed
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to f before proposing to DAW [s(P )](w) and because all workers’ submitted lists
are identical, at that step all unmatched workers proposed to f (and the set of un-
matched workers shrinks from one step to the next one). Let w′ be the least preferred
worker according to Pf in DAW [s(P )](f). But now f profitably deviates from s(P )
in DAW by submitting a list P
′
f where A(P
′
f ) = (DAW [s(P )](f)∪ {w})\{w′}. When
in DAW [P
′
f , s−f (P−f )] worker w proposes to f , all unmatched workers propose to
f in that step because all workers’ submitted lists are identical. Firm f accepts
(DAW [s(P )](f) ∪ {w})\{w′} which is strictly preferred to DAW [s(P )](f) under any
responsive extension P ∗f of Pf . Hence, s(P ) is not a NE in DAW under P , a contra-
diction. 
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